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SHOULD RALPH FLEAGLE HANG?
By Philip S. Van Cise of the Denver Bar*
HERE has been a great deal of discussion among lawyers and laymen, and in the public press as to whether
or not Ralph Fleagle should escape the death penalty
for the Lamar murders, in return for his confession clearing
up the whole tragedy.
There is no doubt in anyone's mind that if there ever
was a case in which capital punishment should be inflicted,
that case is the Lamar bank robbery with its resultant murders.
Four men had been: arrested in other states, charged with
this crime, positively identified by the eyewitnesses in the
bank, extradited to Colorado, and were awaiting trial with
almost certain conviction. Then a fingerprint was found
which identified Jake Fleagle as one of the bandits. Jake has
never been located, but Ralph Fleagle was arrested and
brought to Colorado. No eye witness to the crime could
identify him, (and no attempt was made at the trial so to do),
hence the evidence being circumstantial, only life imprisonment could be inflicted by the jury. Before a jury could return a hanging verdict, as the evidence stood before his confession, Fleagle must make a legal confession or plead guilty.
His associates were unknown, and the authorities wanted the
entire matter cleared up at the earliest possible moment. The
State wanted a confession, Fleagle's attorney, and Fleagle,
wanted to save his neck, and conferences were held. Strange
to relate, though an agreement was made, it was not in writing,
lacked judicial approval-no order of Court being entered
thereon-and the parties thereto are in hopeless confusion as
to what they agreed upon!
The State's witnesses claimed that the agreement was
limited to a promise that the jury would not be asked to return
.EDrrWo's NorE: This article was written by Mr. Van Cise, a former and most
able district attorney for Denver, only with considerable reluictance and at the express
request of Dicta.
The issue tendered has been the subject of much debate, it is not without significance, nor is it purely local in its scope.
As to the conclusion involved, Dicta draws closer the folds of the Editorial
Cloak and continues to think deep thoughts.
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a hanging verdict, the defendant's witnesses (including the
attorney general of Kansas and Chief of Police Harper of
Colorado Springs) that life imprisonment was the promise.
Until Fleagle talked, as matters then stood, Fleagle faced
life imprisonment at the most (and possibly an acquittal).
Would any lawyer advise his client to talk-and run the
chance of being hung-unless he had a promise that by talking
he would at least be as safe as if he had kept his own counsel?
We believe it a fair assumption that both Judge Cunningham
-the attorney for Fleagle-and his client honestly believed
that a promise of life imprisonment was made. And in making
this statement we do not mean to infer that their interpretation
of the contract was justified by the statements of the State,
only that such was their interpretation and belief, and the
reason why Fleagle's lips were unsealed.
Where does this leave the State of Colorado as a matter
of law, criminal practice, and equity?
Three charges were filed against Fleagle:
(a) Murder, which included both first and second degree.
(b) Aggravated robbery, in which the Court alone fixes
the penalty at from ten years to life (C.L. 6718).
(c) Kidnapping, in which neither death nor life imprisonment was involved, simply a short time in the penitentiary.
Fleagle pleaded guilty to all three, and to first degree
murder at that!

Under the statutes (C.L. 6665) the jury alone and no one
else can fix the penalty for first degree murder! No outside
agency of any kind can interfere with this exclusive prerogative.
Many states have statutes authorizing a contract between
the State and a defendant, which can be pleaded in bar, and
afford a confessing defendant absolute protection. Colorado
has no such statute. How then can an agreement with the
State officials be made effective.
It is handled in one of four ways:
1. By a dismissal by the District Attorney, with the consent of the Court.
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2. By accepting a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
(Recommendation by the District Attorney and approved by
the Court).
3. By a written agreement entered into by the District
Attorney and specifically approved by the court by order
entered of record.
4. By an oral understanding between the State and the
defendant.
While none of the first three was in any manner attempted
in this case, and the fourth was indefinite, we will discuss
them in their order.
1. Dismissal or nolle prosequi.
Under the common law and in Colorado, until 1913, a
District Attorney had the absolute right, without the consent
of the court, to enter a dismissal or nolle prosequi. In 1913,
however, this was changed by statute (C.L. 7078) and no
dismissal can now be made except upon written motion in
open court with the consent and approval of the court. This
is no bar to subsequent prosecution, though in practice it disposes of the case.
2. Acceptance of plea to lower offense.
This is a very common practice in all the Courts of Colorado, where manslaughter is accepted for murder, simple
robbery for aggravated robbery, etc., and is an absolute bar
to a second trial for the greater offense.
3. Written agreement entered into by the District Attorney and defendant and approved by the court.
In the Denver bunco cases immunity was given to Len
Reamey by a written agreement entered into between Reamey
and the Special Prosecutors and specifically approved by
Judge Butler, both in writing and by order of Court. After
Reamey fulfilled his agreement with the State his case was
dismissed.
Some states enforce an oral agreement, but the weight of
authority requires consent of Court. The reason for the rule
is well expressed in People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 708, as follows:
"So long as, by the policy of the law, accomplices are deemed competent
witnesses against their fellows, so long must a discretion in regard to admitting
them be vested somewhere or other in the government. It could not, con-
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sistently with the nature of the power or the course and character of judicial
proceedings, be committed to the chief executive magistrate; nor could it,
with propriety, be intrusted to the public prosecutor or any other inferior
ministerial officer of justice, because, strictly speaking, it is the exercise of a
high judicial discretion; and the reasons for vesting it in the court, rather
than in the committing magistrate, or even the public prosecutor, is, that
the admission of the party as a witness amounts to a promise by the court
of a recommendation to mercy, upon condition of his making a full and fair
disclosure of all the circumstances of the crime."

4. Oral agreement between the State and the defendant,
without the approval of the Court.

Such an arrangement is of no value whatever in Colorado, affords no protection to the defendant, an:d cannot be
offered in evidence. It also is dangerous, as it opens the door
of misunderstanding.
There is only one Colorado case on the subject, and while
not squarely in point it passes upon the power of the district
attorney. One Giano, long before Volstead days, was tried
and convicted of selling liquor. At the trial an offer of proof
was made that he had been previously tried for a similar
offense, and that a mistrial resulted, and that thereupon some
sort of an understanding was entered into between defendant
and the district attorney, whereby defendant was not to be
further prosecuted. This offer was rejected. The Court sustained this ruling and stated:
"We are not aware that the District Attorney has the power to suspend
the operation of a statute or to make a valid agreement by which he is to
refrain from enforcing the criminal laws of the State * * * proof of such an
agreement, if made, was improper."

And this decision is in line with decisions elsewhere:
"The decided weight of authority sustains the doctrine that an agreement to turn State's evidence, made with the prosecuting officer alone, without
the court's advice or consent, affords the defendant no protection in the event
he be placed on trial in violation of the agreement."
I Bishop's New Criminal Law, 9th Edition, 679.

This leaves only two propositions for discussion, what
should have been done to perfect an agreement, and what
should the State do under the present circumstances.
A written agreement could have been entered into under
which Fleagle pleaded guilty to both aggravated robbery and
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kidnapping and received life imprisonment on the former
and the maximum term of years on the latter. The agreement could have been filed in the murder case, together with
a motion to dismiss, approved by the Court and contingent
upon full confession and disclosure by Fleagle and testimony
against his accomplices. Upon compliance with his bargain
the dismissal in the murder case would have been entered as
a matter of course and the matter disposed'of for all time.
Under the practice in this State (though it has not been
passed upon by the Supreme Court) many pleas of second
degree murder have been accepted by the Court though the
facts call for first degree murder. If a plea of guilty to second
degree murder had been accepted in this case, life imprisonment could have been imposed thereon by the judge without
a jury. Then an absolute bar would have been created to
further prosecution.
What Should the State Do?
Bearing in mind that the State had several innocent men
in jail awaiting trial on this Lamar murder charge-men who
had been positively identified as the murderers, that the State
could not hang Fleagle and did not know his confederates,
(except Jake), that by keeping quiet his neck was safe, while
by confessing he saved the State from probable judicial murder of innocent men, cleaned up the whole tragedy, and
secured the conviction of his accomplices Abshier and
Royston, what should the State do?
Our most dangerous criminals are not individuals, but
organized gangs. What breaks them up and keeps their numbers small is not fear of the law-but of each other. The
ordinary man sneers at the man who turns state's evidence and
defendant's lawyers call him a sneak and a traitor. Yet he
is the greatest protection society has against gangdom, and
constitutes the greatest menace to the underworld. Police
officials, like Chief Harper of Colorado Springs, district attorneys and law enforcing agencies, all know that in order to
get results concessions of some sort must be made to some
criminals (and often to desperate ones) in order to enforce the
law. But before a law-enforcing officer can get this help
from a defendant he must "tote-square" with the underworld.
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Once it is known that the defendant has been double-crossed
by an official, that officer's usefulness to society is in a large
measure ended. [And we charge no state official in this case
with bad faith of any kind].
Fleagle, under the methods pursued in his case, has no
redress in law (unless for errors in the trial). His resort is
to the pardoning power for commutation to life imprisonment. What action the governor should take is clearly set
forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. v.
Ford, 99 U. S. 593, 25 L. Ed. 399-403, where the Court said:
"The accomplice acquires only an equitable right to the clemency of
* * * Should it be objected that the application may not be
answer of the court must be in substance that given by Lord
similar occasion, that we are not to presume that the equitable
which the humblest and most criminal accomplice may thus

the Executive
successful, the
Denman on a
title to mercy

acquire by testifying in a Federal Court will not be sacredly accorded to him
by the President, in whom the pardoning power is vested by the Federal

Constitution."

